




Employment, Partnership and Childbearing Decisions
of German Women and Men:
A Simultaneous Hazards Approach
by
Markus Niedergesäss
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
www.wiwi.uni-tuebingen.de
Employment, partnership and childbearing decisions of
German women and men: A Simultaneous hazards
approach 1
Markus Niedergesäss (University of Tübingen)
This version: 25th January 2013
Abstract. This paper investigates the interrelated dynamics of employment, cohabitation and fertility
for German women and men. Using a simultaneous hazards approach due to Lillard (1993), I estimate a
ve-equation model with unobserved heterogeneity. One of the contributions of this paper is to include
the current employment and nonemployment hazard rates and the union formation and union dissolution
hazard rates as regressors. My results suggest that being employed or nonemployed only has small eects
on other transitions, but that employed women with a high hazard of becoming nonemployed are less
likely to have children, while nonemployed men having a low hazard of nding a job are more likely
to have children. Children reduce the hazard of taking up a job for women and reduce the hazard of
becoming nonemployed for women and men. Children also increase the stability of unions. Having a
partner strongly increases the likelihood for having children. Interestingly, unions with a high risk of
splitting up are more likely to have children. Economically, this can be interpreted as an attempt to
invest in partner-specic capital in order to reduce the likelihood of splitting up.
JEL-Classication: C33, C41, J64, J130, J230
Keywords: Employment, Fertility, Marriage, Family planning, Labor demand, Simultaneous hazards
Correspondence:
Markus Niedergesäss, Department of Economics, University of Tübingen, Mohlstr. 36, 72074 Tübingen,
Germany, Phone: +49-7071-2977662, markus.niedergesaess@uni-tuebingen.de
1I am grateful to Martin Biewen, Bernhard Boockmann, Joachim Grammig and seminar participants in Tü-
bingen and Hohenheim for extensive discussion and comments. The data in this study was made available by the
Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency. Special thanks go to the persons responsible
for the project "Qualications, Competencies and Working Life" at the department "Education and Employment
over the Life Course" of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB), in particular to Britta Matthes and Manfred
Antoni, for their excellent support and answers with respect the data set.
1 Introduction
During the last decades Germany has seen tremendous changes in employment and family out-
comes. Fertility rates have dropped from 2.031 in 1970 to 1.381 per women in 20082. Women
have become older at rst and all subsequent births and more often do not have children at
all. Socioeconomic reasons often named for this are the increased female participation in higher
education and the increase in female labor force participation which has risen from 46% in 1970
to 69% in 20083. Nonetheless, the overall labor market situation has changed for women and
men. Germany has undergone strong uctuations in unemployment, and jobs have become more
exible but also less stable. This holds true especially for young workers for whom an unclear
employment situation often has strong eects on family planning. However, it is not only em-
ployment that has changed. There also new forms of cohabitation. Marriage has become less
important, while more and more couples cohabit without being married. Finally, marriages have
become less stable which is reected by an increasing number of divorces and which has resulted
in a strong increase in the number of single-parents and patchwork-families.
The developments described above depend on processes which are generally assumed to be
interrelated. For example, fertility decisions are inuenced by a women's employment status,
which in turn depends on whether or not there are children. The economic literature deals
with many aspects of the dierent interrelations between employment, partnership and fertility
outcomes. Authors like Lillard and Waite (1991, 1993) and Steele et al. (2005) take account
of the interrelations between cohabitation and fertility. A very general nding of these papers
is that children increase the stability of marriages, although stability depends on children's age.
Also the interrelations between labor force participation and fertility are of interest, in particular,
between fertility and female labor force participation. Typical examples are Angrist and Evans
(1998), Hyslop (1999), and Michaud and Tatsiramos (2011). These studies mostly indicate that
children, in particular pre-school children, reduce participation rates of women. However, labor
market outcomes do also aect family outcomes. Del Bono et al. (2012), for example, show that
a job loss yields a postponement of childbirth for Austrian women, while Eliason (2012) indicates
that a job loss results in an increase of divorce rates for Swedish men. Nonetheless, only Aassve et
2See Human Fertility Database. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany) and Vienna
Institute of Demography (Austria). Available at www.humanfertility.org (data downloaded on 23rd November,
2012)
3See Statistisches Bundesamt. Available at www.destatis.de (data downloaded on 23rd November, 2012)
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al. (2006) consider the three processes of employment, cohabitation or marriage, and childbirth
jointly. Joint estimation however is important to identify also indirect eects and to take account
of unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, a job loss may inuence fertility decisions directly but
also via its eects on union stability.
A further aspect, which so far has only attracted little attention is how transition risks, i.e. the
risk of becoming unemployed or of exiting a union, inuence other outcomes. From an economic
perspective, using simultaneous hazards also as regressors provides important insights, because
they take account of how expectations on one outcome may aect other outcomes. Individuals
may, for example, delay or cancel cohabitation and childbirth decisions, if they work in an unstable
employment and are uncertain about their future employment state. Furthermore, couples with
a high risk of splitting up may postpone childbirth decisions until they have found better-suiting
partners. However, children may also be used as a way to rescue their relationship. So far as I am
aware, only Lillard (1993) and Lillard and Waite (1993) consider how the transition risk of one
process aects the outcome of an other process. More precisely, they both use the dissolution
hazard as a regressor for the fertility process indicate that unions with a high risk to split up less
likely have children.
This paper adds to the literature by using hazard regression techniques in order to estimate a ve-
equation model which includes employment, non-employment, union formation, union dissolution,
and conception. Using a hazard approach comes with the advantage that eects can often be
identied more precisely. For example, children obviously reduce female labor force participation.
However, for employed women children may also increase the attachment with the current job due
to increased expenses. Such eects, however, cannot be identied, if the state of being employed
is modeled by a simple logit or probit model. In addition to Aassve et al. (2006) I also include
the current hazards of losing and nding a job as regressors for the union formation and union
dissolution hazards and the conception hazard. Furthermore, also the union formation and union
dissolution hazards are used as regressors for the conception hazard. In general, risks are seldom
used as regressors, and if so mostly a two-step procedure not taking into account a possible
dependence of unobserved heterogeneity (see for example Del Bono, 2001 who uses employment
and income risks as regressors for the fertility hazard). From an econometric perspective, Lillard
(1993) and Lillard and Waite (1993) provide the only exemptions who use a simultaneous hazards
approach in which also the hazard of one process directly aects the hazard of a second process. In
this study the framework is of a higher complexity, since ve processes are used and several hazards
may have an inuence on one process. Using a triangular form and a small set of exogenous
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regressors which also include the process-specic variables accounting for state dependence, is
sucient to identify the eects.
This study investigates eects for the 1960-69-cohort of German women and men using data
from the study "Working and Learning in a changing world" (ALWA). The data set provides
retrospective information on all ve processes and information is of a very high precision as it is
given on a monthly basis and there is no attrition in the sample. Furthermore, the observational
period is very long, because individuals are observed from primary school onwards. The data-set
is therefore well-suited for this type of analysis. My results suggest that employed women with
a high hazard of becoming nonemployed are less likely to have children, while nonemployed men
with a low hazard of nding a job are more likely to have children. The state of employment,
however, has no eect on other hazards, although employed men are less likely to split up their
relationships. Furthermore, results point out that being in a union strongly increases the likelihood
of having children. In contrast to economic theory and empirical ndings for the United States
(see Lillard, 1993 and Lillard and Waite, 1993), unions with a high risk of splitting up are more
likely to have children. A possible explanation for the result found, is that unions with a high risk
of splitting up tend to use children as an investment in partnership-specic capital which in turn
is used to increase the stability of the current union. Such investments may have become more
widespread, because separation costs have fallen and investments in partnership-specic capital
have shifted from marriage to children.
By adding a binary indicator for current pregnancy, my paper also provides new insights on
interrelations between fertility and female labor force participation. In contrast to Aassve et al.
(2006) and large parts of the literature, my results suggest that children reduce the likelihood of
becoming nonemployed, and that only a current pregnancy strongly increases the likelihood of a
transition to nonemployment. My results therefore imply that also for women children increase the
attachment with their current employment. With regard to the transition of becoming employed,
the results show that children and current pregnancy reduce the likelihood of becoming employed.
For men, children have no eect on the transition of becoming employed, while they also decrease
the hazard of becoming nonemployed.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. The next two sections provide an overview of
the related literature and the institutional framework during the observational period. The fourth
section presents the data set and explains the sample selection. The fth section then deals with




For a long time, there has been a strong interest in the interrelation of employment and family
outcomes. Fundamental theoretical contributions on this topic are Becker (1976, 1981), Cigno
(1991), and Apps and Rees (2001). Nonetheless, they all focus on interrelations of fertility and
female labor force participation. With regard to the eects children have on (female) labor force
participation, Angrist and Evans (1998) and Hyslop (1999) are prominent empirical examples.
While the rst study uses twins as an instrument in order to estimate the eect family size has on
labor force participation, the latter study uses a Maximum Simulated Likelihood approach taking
into account state dependence and serial correlation of unobserved heterogeneity terms. More
recent studies often use simultaneous estimation approaches (see Francesconi, 2002, or Michaud
and Tatsiramos, 2011) or quasi-experimental designs (see Fröhlich and Melly, 2012). All studies
named here suggest that children decrease female labor force participation, but usually no eects
can be found for men.
The eects of employment on fertility and cohabitation are also of great interest. Ahn and
Mira (2001) show that Spanish men delay childbearing and also marriage decisions, if they are
nonemployed or only have a xed-term work contract. Gutiérrez-Domènech (2008) shows that
Spanish women delay childbearing decisions, if they are employed. However, eects are mixed
with regard to marriage. While older cohorts delay marriage, if they are employed, younger cohorts
tend marry ar an earlier stage. The author also points out that male unemployment results in
a postponement of marriage and thereby has negative eects on fertility outcomes. Del Bono
(2001) nds that British women delay childbearing decisions as a consequence of unemployment
experiences. She also shows that the eect is stronger for women expecting high future wages and
that women who expect more favorable job opportunities in the future bring childbearing decisions
forward. More recently, Del Bono et al. (2012), using rm closures as quasi-experiments, show
that unemployment experiences of Austrian women result in a delay of childbearing decisions.
Eliason (2012) nds that unemployment experiences also increase the risk of separation. Using
data for Sweden, he shows that for men the excess divorce rate is by 13% higher if there was a
unemployment experience, while eects are similar but not signicant for women. For the case of
Germany, Kreyenfeld (2000) provides some insight. She shows that unemployment experiences
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of East German women increase the hazard for a rst birth.
With regard to the interrelation of cohabitation or marriage and childbearing there is a large
number of studies using simultaneous estimation approaches and thereby take account of these
interrelations. Lillard and Waite (1991), using data on American women and men, show that pre-
school children born inside a union increase the stability of a marriage, whereas older children and
children born prior to a marriage increase the probability of disruption. Steele et al. (2005) show
that for British women pre-school children stabilize unions, whether born within a marriage or not.
Again, eects are weaker for older children. Brien et al. (1999), using data from the National
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, point out a strong positive dependence
between cohabitation, marriage and pre-marital birth for women. Lillard (1993) and Lillard and
Waite (1993) show that for married couples an increase in the hazard of dissolution has strong
negative on marital childbearing. These studies are of particular interest, because the authors
point out that expectations about the future union status play a role for childbearing decisions.
Finally, Aassve et al. (2006) are the only ones who model employment, cohabitation and child-
bearing decisions jointly. They nd that being employed has a negative eect on childbearing for
women but a positive for men. Being employed also has a positive eect on union formation for
women and men and on union dissolution for women. Finally, with regard to the eects of family
outcomes on transitions from and to employment, results are all as one would expect.
3 Institutional Framework
The period of interest for the cohort under consideration is from 1975 until 2008. For this period,
several policy instruments are used to support the birth and upbringing of children. During the
whole period child allowances (Kindergeld) were provided for dependent children. The receipt
of child allowances for the rst child was introduced in 1975. Since then the amount has varied
steadily. From 1975 onwards, the amount for the rst child increased from 26e in 1975 to 154e in
2008. In addition to child allowances for each dependent child, a tax allowance independent of the
number of children was introduced in 1989. From 1996 until today, parents have been receiving
either a tax allowance or a child allowance depending on which is more advantageous.
Maternity leave (Mutterschaftsurlaub) has been used as an instrument to secure the job and
income during which an expecting mother cannot work due to her pregnancy. An expecting
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mother is obliged to take maternity leave from six weeks prior to a birth until eight weeks after
a birth. During this period 100% of the actual wage is paid and women are not allowed to be
dismissed.
With regard to other forms of support, parents receive during the rst years after a birth, the
sample period can be divided into three subperiods. From 1979 to 1986, employed mothers were
able to receive Mutterschaftsurlaubsgeld, for a period away from work of up to six months during
which they received 383e (750 DM) per month. This amount was reduced to 261e (510 DM)
in 1984. The Mutterschaftsurlaubsgeld was introduced in order to better combine motherhood
and job, but it was abolished in 1986. From 1986 to 2007, either parent could take parental leave
and receive a parental allowance (Erziehungsgeld). The parental allowance varied from 307e for
a period of ten months in 1986 to 450e for a period of twelve months or 300e for a period of
24 months in 2004. While receiving parental allowances a parent was allowed to work for only
up to 30 hours per week. The parental allowance was heavily criticized, as it was considered
to keep young mothers away from the labor market (see for example Schönberg and Ludsteck,
2007). In 2007 the Elterngeld was introduced. It can be splitted between partners, is paid for
up to fourteen months and depends on the prior net income. Parents receive at least a minimum
amount of 300e up to a maximum amount of 1800e. The Elterngeld was introduced with the
goal to keep young mothers, in particular highly qualied ones, in touch with the labor market.
Despite of the increase in child and parental allowances, there was a decline in fertility rates from
1.527 births per women in 1975 to 1.381 in 20084, while the mean age at birth rose from 26.25
in 1975 to 30.01 in 20085. This indicates that, at least at an overall level, the policies were not
eective in increasing fertility rates. One reason often named, is the missing compatibility of job
and family for women. This issue has become more relevant because of an increasing female labor
market participation6. In 2008, the participation of mothers was still lower than that of fathers
and the proportion of part-time employment was around 70% for all women (see Statistisches
4See Human Fertility Database. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany) and Vienna
Institute of Demography (Austria). Available at www.humanfertility.org (data downloaded on 23rd November,
2012)
5See Human Fertility Database. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany) and Vienna
Institute of Demography (Austria). Available at www.humanfertility.org (data downloaded on 23rd November,
2012)
6In 1975 48.17% of all women aged 15-65 were part of the labor force, while it were 68.96% in 2008. See
Statistisches Bundesamt. Available at www.destatis.de (data downloaded on 23rd November, 2012)
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Bundesamt, 2011).
In 1977, Germany underwent a major reform of the Marriage and Family Law (Erstes Gesetz zur
Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts) which introduced the equal status of wife and husband
in marriage and divorce. After this reform, it was no longer relevant for maintenance payments
who caused a divorce. Since then the number of marriages has decreased7, while the number
of divorces has increased8. On the other side, other forms of cohabitation have become more
popular (see for example Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011). In particular, younger couples form
unions without ever getting married. This increase comes along with a rise of the number of
children born out of wedlock. Moreover, the number of single mothers has increased steadily
from 13.8% in 1996 to 18.8% in 2008. From a tax perspective, forms of cohabitation other than
marriage have become popular despite the fact that married couples benet from more generous
tax exemptions9. The tax advantage of married couple is the larger the more unequal earnings
are between wife and husband.
Until 2004, the German unemployment insurance system consisted of two components, unemploy-
ment benets (Arbeitslosengeld) and unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe). In addition
to the nancial support for the unemployed, several Active Labor Market Policies existed with
the goal of bringing back unemployed into permanent employment. Beginning in 2003 the "Laws
of a modern provision of services on the labor market" (Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen
am Arbeitsmarkt) became eective. The reforms were conducted as a response to the enor-
mous rise in the unemployment rate from 4.7% in 1975 to 13.0% in 200510. These so-called
Hartz-reforms are a heavily discussed topic in the literature (an excellent survey is Jacobi and
Kluve, 2006). They included changes in occupational training programs, new forms of temporary
employment, new forms of marginal employment, improvements of the matching of unemployed
and rms with vacancies, and, in particular, the abolishment of unemployment assistance. There
are now two new components of the unemployment compensation system, unemployment benet
7In 1975 6.7 of 1000 inhabitants have married, while it were only 4.6 in 2008. See Statistisches Bundesamt.
Available at www.destatis.de (data downloaded on 23rd November, 2012)
8In 1975 there were 1.9 of 1000 inhabitants that divorced, while it were 2.3 in 2008. See Statistisches
Bundesamt. Available at www.destatis.de (data downloaded on 23rd November, 2012)
9The so-called Ehegattensplitting privileges those unions with only the men or women working. See for example
Folkers, 2003.
10See Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Available at www.arbeitsagentur.de (data downloaded on 23rd November,
2012)
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I (ALG I ) and unemployment benet II (ALG II ). ALG I is similar to the unemployment benet
paid before the Hartz-reform, although replacement ratios and entitlement periods have chan-
ged. ALG II combines unemployment assistance and social assistance (Sozialhilfe). Although the
Hartz-reforms were heavily discussed, results show that, at least in some aspects, the reforms were
successful (see for example Jacobi and Kluve, 2006 or Fahr and Sunde, 2006). The Hartz-reforms
are also named as one reason for the drop in the unemployment rate to 8.7% in 200811. However,
a side-eect of the reforms was an increase in types of employment which are generally linked




For this study I use the "Working and Learning in a changing world" ("Arbeit und Leben im
Wandel", ALWA) data set that was collected within the project "Qualications, Competencies
and Working Life" at the department "Education and Employment over the Life Course" of
the Institute of Employment Research (IAB). The data set was originally designed to analyze
the dependencies between the employment history, educational degrees and basic skills. It is,
however, a very precise and informative data set well suited for the analysis conducted here. The
data set considers as its population all individuals born between 1956 and 1988 and living in
Germany in July 2007. Of this population, a random sample was drawn and voluntary interviews
were conducted in order to construct a retroperspective life course for each individual.
In total, 10,404 individuals were interviewed. Of those individuals, 227 were interviewed in
Turkish or Russian. I drop those 227 individuals, because they were interviewed about only a
small part of their life course. As it is typical with voluntary interviews, the resulting sample is
not representative for the population. Although incentives were given to promote participation
in the interviews12, the nal sample overrepresents older and higher educated individuals.
The information about the life courses is given on a monthly basis and starts with the beginning of
11see Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2011
12All participants received 15 efor taking part in the interview and could take part in a lottery.
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primary school. Because the information was collected retrospectively, attrition does not present
a problem. The data set therefore provides highly precise information and very long life courses
in comparison to survey data such as the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) or the British
Household Panel (BHPS). However, a general problem with retrospective data is misreporting, in
particular, of information on events that happened early in the life course. In order to reduce such
measurement errors, the interviewers were instructed to inquire again, if inconsistencies in the life
courses occurred (see for example Antoni et al., 2010 and Gilberg et al., 2011). In general, the
resulting data set provides a comprehensive and precise information source on the individual life
courses.
The data set consists of dierent subles. In order to create one common event-history le, all
subles are merged with each other and additional external covariates. The nal event-history
le then represents the complete life course of the individual from age 15 up to the censoring
point. Information on life courses is given, as said, on a monthly basis, which allows a precise
examination of interrelations between employment and family outcomes. The data set provides
information on birth records of every child born to a certain individual and every child once
living together with this individual. Furthermore, information on all cohabiting unions of an
individual are given, i.e. start and end dates as well as information on the respective union like
marriage status or the age or the educational level of partner. In addition to family outcomes,
the life courses also present detailed information on the current occupational status, where the
occupational status comprises schooling, further education, employment, unemployment, military
or civil service, periods as housewife, and further periods. The data set also provides a large
set of covariates covering employment-specic, partner-specic and child-specic information. In
addition, external information, such as regional unemployment rates are merged with the life
courses.
In Germany as well as in other European countries, cohabitation is an increasing form of union
(see for example Köppen, 2011). In particular, cohabitation as a rst form of union is common.
Cohabitations may therefore precede a marriage, but may also act as a substitute. A further point
which has to be taken into consideration is that there is an increasing number of non-marital
births. I therefore follow Aassve et al. (2006) and use cohabitation as dependent variable. This
means, all heterosexual couples living together in one household or married to each other13 are
13In general, most married couples also live within the same household. However, there is a small number of
individuals that begin to cohabitate after they have married. These individuals are also considered as cohabiting
from the start of their marriage.
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considered as cohabiting union. The cohabitation starts when the individuals move in together
and ends when they split up. This also applies to married couples for whom divorce is considered
as one possible end. One generally could also assume couples as unions that do not live in the
same household. However, such forms of unions are prone to misreporting and represent a weaker
form of misreporting so that I do not follow this approach here.
With regard to employment and nonemployment, I consider all individuals as employed, if they
are in paid employment, no matter if it is full or part-time employment. This means that also
self-employed individuals are considered as employed. Women that are on maternity leave ("Mut-
terschaftsurlaub") are also considered as employed, while women and men that are on parental
leave ("Elternzeit") are considered as nonemployed. Nonemployment further captures periods
in unemployment, education, as a housewife or househusband, and periods of military or civil
service. The employment status of an individual changes if she or he moves in and out of paid
employment. This means that periods of subsequent movements from one employer to an other
are considered as one employment period, while for example moving from unemployment to
schooling is considered as one nonemployment period.
Of the 10,177 individuals who were interviewed in German, I focus on the cohort of individuals born
between 1960 and 1969. Cohort eects are likely to exist for female labor market participation,
the duration of unions or the number of children born to an individual. In addition to all same-sex
couples, I drop all nuns, monks and priests, because they neither participate in the labor market
nor in the marriage market. Finally, due to the socialist regime in East Germany until 1990, labor
market conditions were not comparable to West Germany at the time when most individuals enter
the labor market. I therefore focus on individuals that were raised up and start their career in
Western Germany. This does not exclude individuals who move to East Germany after 1990.
4.2 Sampling design
An individuals' rst employment or nonemployment process generally starts when she enters the
labor market. For most individuals this point equals the date when the individual gets in touch
with the labor market for the rst time. However, some individuals work for a short period prior
to entering university, while others register as unemployed after leaving secondary school and
return to the education system only after a short time. Although these periods constitute a rst
contact to the labor market, they are hardly comparable to employment and nonemployment
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periods after the individual has left the education system for good. Such periods rather display
short interruptions of education periods and mostly take place in occupations dierent to the
ones the individuals choose later on. The goal of this study, however, is to disentangle the eects
employment and nonemployment have on family outcomes. In particular, it shall be highlighted
how the hazards of becoming nonemployed or nding a job inuence the probabilities of having
a partner or having children. The labor market entry is therefore assumed to be the start date of
the rst spell after the individual has left the educational institution, where she achieves or could
have possibly achieved her highest degree. This also includes individuals who, for example, choose
to become housewife or househusband. Nonetheless, the approach discussed so far includes few
exemptions for whom the denition of the labor market entry does not t very well. An example
is an individual, who after obtaining an high school and vocational training degree, works for ten
years and then chooses to go to university. In order to account for such exemptions, I set age
limits until which a certain type of education form has to be started14.
Although decisions on partnership and having children are seldom made while being in school or
in education15, individuals may form a rst union or even may have children before entering the
labor market. In order to account for this, the processes of union formation and conception start
when the individual becomes fteen.
 Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 presents two typical persons that both enter the labor market at age twenty. While Person
A has not yet formed a union when entering the labor market, Person B has already formed a
union and has conceived a child when she or he enters the labor market. Due to the fact that
notably the eects employment and nonemployment have on family outcomes shall be identied,
only those union formation and dissolution and conception spells are used for estimation which
are in progress when the individual enters the labor market or which begin afterwards. All prior
outcomes are used for construction of stocks. Finally, estimation requires a common starting
point. I therefore assume the union formation, dissolution and conception spells to be quasi-left-
truncated at the time of the labor market entry, i.e. I follow Lancaster (1979) and condition the
likelihood contribution of the spell in progress on the probability of surviving in that state until
14A precise description of the dierent age levels is given in the Appendix
15With regard to partnership, university students provide an exemption. However, only few students decide to
have a child during their academic studies.
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the labor market entry. For person A in gure 1 this means that likelihood contributions of the
union formation and the conception spell are conditioned on the probability surviving in these
states since age fteen. For person B, the likelihood contributions of the union formation process
and the conception process are conditioned on the probability of surviving in the current union
and not conceiving until entering labor market.
The way a common starting date for all processes is chosen, is quite dierent to, for example,
Aassve et al. (2006) who let all processes begin at age thirteen. However, a particularly relevant
point of this study is to estimate how the hazard of moving from employment and nonemploy-
ment or vice versa aect the processes of union formation, dissolution and conception. Letting
all processes start at age thirteen, would mean that these risk measures were inuenced by whe-
ther there is a transition from unemployment to employment or from education to employment.
Also the eect nonemployment itself has on conception depends on whether an individual is in
education or is a housewife or househusband. The strategy of how the common starting date is
chosen therefore provides a way to account for the eects of what one may call the "real" labor
market risks. Nonetheless, the strategy comes with the disadvantage that the labor market entry
is an endogenous starting point depending on observable and unobservable characteristics.
Furthermore, a strong desire for having children may result in having children prior to entering the
labor market, which may inuence the point of entering the labor market. However, such a strong
desire for having children may also aect employment decisions afterwards. In order to account
for such initial condition problems, I condition the process-specic unobserved heterogeneity on a
set of variables consisting of the age at entry, whether the individual is employed after entering the
labor market, whether she was in a union and had children, and of an interaction term accounting
for whether she went to university and had children prior to entering the labor market. A more
technical description of how I deal with the initial conditions is given in subsection 5.2.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for women and men born between 1960 and 1969.
Results show that more women (1428) than men (1312) are part of the sample. Comparing women
and men, the numbers show that the average birth year is the same for women (1964.21) and for
men (1964.23) but that men are better educated than women. In particular, the proportion of men
having an university degree or a degree from a technical college is higher for men (28.13%) than for
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women (17.57%). On average, women are more than one year younger than men when entering
the labor market (20.92 vs. 22.15 years). This may be due to spending less time in education,
but also due to the fact that almost all men belonging to this cohort had to do military service
or civil service. Subsequently, men spent on average almost three years longer in employment
than women (191.87 vs. 226.79 months) and around 50 months less in nonemployment (71.15
vs. 21.42 months). This nding indicates that, although part-time employment is included, the
employment ratio of women is signicantly lower than for men in this cohort.
 Table 1 about here 
Looking at relationships, it is easy to see that women are on average younger than men when
forming their rst union (24.21 vs 26.95). This means that women also more quickly form a
union after entering the labor market (3.29 vs 4.80 years). Furthermore, one has to note that
more men never enter a union until being censored (6.58% vs. 10.67%) and that the proportion
of men forming two or more unions is also slightly higher (18.84% vs. 19.59%).
With regard to children the numbers show that on average men have signicantly fewer children
than women (1.56 vs. 1.26). This is a typical nding in the literature (see Aassve et al., 2006 for
the case of the British Household Panel, BHPS) and two possible reasons can be named. First,
men are, on average, older than women when having a rst birth (29.65 vs. 27.00). This also
holds true for further births. Therefore, the number of children not part of the data set due to
right-censoring tends to be higher for men than for women. A second point may be misreporting
among men. In spite of the high quality of the data set, it is a general nding that misreporting
with regard to family outcomes is much higher for men than for women (for fertility histories in
the BHPS see Rendall et al., 1999). This in turn may explain in parts the lower fertility rate for
men.
In general, a comparison of the results for the cohort used here with ocial data shows that with
respect to the number of children, the data set ts well. For example, women born in 1962 have on
average 1.56 children. Since one of the aims of this study is to investigate the eects employment
and nonemployment have on fertility, it is interesting to see what happens to fertility rates when
individuals are nonemployed or employed in an unstable environment. Having been nonemployed
for at least one month increases the duration in the labor market until the conception of a rst
child signicantly for women (6.05 vs. 6.64 years) and even more for men (6.38 vs. 8.67 years).
But it is not only nonemployment, also the expectation about the stability of a job seems to play
13
a strong role in determining fertility. Also, having been temporarily employed for at least one
month increases the duration in the labor market until the conception of a rst child for women
(6.14 vs. 6.78 years) and even more for men (7.49 vs. 8.49 years). Despite of this being no
causal analysis, these results indicate that job stability and the expectation about it play a role
for the timing of a rst birth.
A further point worth mentioning is that for women, almost 20% of all births occur outside a
union, while it is only around 8% of all births for men. This supports a possible misreporting
among men, as it is likely that men will not report children when they are born outside a union
and no union is formed afterwards.
5 Econometric Framework
Based on the work of Lillard (1993) two models of interrelated dynamic discrete choices are
specied. In both models the discrete choices are dened over employment, nonemployment,
union formation, union dissolution and conception and the dynamics are considered jointly. The
ve processes are specied as transition intensities, which are conditional on the time spent in
the respective state, exogenous and endogenous covariates, as well as unobserved heterogeneity
components that may be correlated with each other.
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where ln(hsA), s = E,U,M,D,C, are the logarithms of the hazards of employment, nonem-
ployment, union formation, union dissolution and conception. Individuals start the processes of









when entering the labor market for the rst time. This means they are at risk of nding employ-
ment, if they are currently nonemployed. After nding employment, they are at risk at of entering
the state of nonemployment. These events may be repeated several times and an individual can
only be in one of the two states at a time T = t, i.e. the processes are mutually exclusive.









). The process of union formation is assumed to start at age 15 years, i.e. the
individual is single at this age. After the individual starts her rst union, she is at the risk of
dissoluting the union. Again these events may be repeated several times. Further, individuals





) starts at this age. After the rst conception, individuals become at
risk of having a second conception and so on. Thus conceptions are specied within one hazard
function.
For estimation, a common starting point is needed, which is assumed to be the date of labor
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market entry T = t0. As the processes of union formation, union dissolution and conception
start prior to t0, only those spells are used that are in progress or start after t0 and the likelihood
contribution of the spell in progress is conditioned on the probability of survival until t0.
For all the processes the baseline transition intensity is modeled as a piecewise constant function.
More precisely, T s(t) is a (Ks × 1)-vector of binary indicator variables whose coecients are
allowed to dier between the Ks time intervals. Denoting the interval bounds for process S = s
as τ sk , the binary indicator variable for the kth interval is dened as
T s(t) = 1
{
τ sk−1 < t− t̃
s ≤ τ sk
}
, k = 2, . . . , Ks and s = (E,U,M,D,C),
where t̃s is the start date of the current spell of the respective process. Modeling the elapsed
duration as a piecewise constant function is a exible way to account for duration dependence.
Doing so also allows to account for possible nonlinearities. Age eects As(t) are specied similarly
in order to capture possible nonlinearties.
In addition to age eects, I include controls for the stock of each event P s(t) accounting for
occurrence and lagged duration dependence eects. While the stock of children is implemented
as dummy variables, the stock of partners and the stocks for employment and nonemployment is
specied as the cumulative occurrence. For the processes of employment and nonemployment,
I also include the cumulative durations in employment and nonemployment. Furthermore, the
stock of children enters all ve processes, while the other stocks only enter the respective pair
of mutually exclusive processes. Furthermore, I include endogenous binary variables 1{E(t)}
accounting for the employment status and 1{M(t)} for the cohabitation status. 1{E(t)} enters
the processes of union formation and dissolution and the process of conception, while 1{M(t)}
enter the process of conception and the processes of employment and nonemployment. Finally,
1{C(t)} is a binary indicator that displays whether the individual or his respective partner is
currently pregnant. This indicator enters the processes of employment, nonemployment, union
formation and union dissolution.
I also condition the processes on a set of exogenous covariates Xj(t). This set of covariates
diers between the ve processes. The ALWA data set includes a rich set of exogenous covariates.
Furthermore environmental covariates like the unemployment rate or the growth rate are included.
In this study, I do not account for the order of conception or for the order of the union. However,
it is clear that results may depend on the order of birth. The transition to the rst union and
rst birth probably diers from later transitions. Likewise there is a large strand of the literature
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focusing on rst unions and births (see for example Le Go, 2002 or Billari and Philipov, 2004).
Also transitions from school to employment may be dierent to transitions from unemployment
to employment. Like Aassve et al. (2006) I do not take account of the order because of the
already high complexity of the model. Furthermore, several authors have argued that cohabitation
and marriage dier in their eects on childbirth (see for example Steele et al. 2005). Also
nonemployment tends to be a rather heterogenous state that may include unemployed individuals
as well as housewives or -husbands. A similar issue concerns employment. Francesconi (2002)
for example points out that women working part-time are more likely to have children than
women working full-time. Nonetheless, the already complex structure of both models requires to
collapse part-time work and full-time work into one employment state. The same holds true for
nonemployment and cohabitation.
Model B: In addition to Model A, the processes for union formation, union dissolution and
conception include the logarithm of the employment and nonemployment hazard. The process
of conception additionally includes the logarithm of the union formation and dissolution hazards.
These are interrelated with the state dummies because, e.g., the hazard of becoming nonemployed














































































where ln(hsA), s = E,U,M,D,C are the log hazards from Model A. For example, m8 captures
the inuence of the hazard of becoming nonemployed on the hazard of entering a union. More
precisely, an increase by 1% of the hazard becoming nonemployed, results in an increase of
the hazard of entering a union by m8%. The coecient reects whether and to what extent
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individuals with stable jobs are more attractive for possible partners on the marriage market.
Obviously, one could also assume that the risk of becoming pregnant has an eect on employment
or union dissolution. However, this study particularly focuses on the eects employment risks
have on union formation, union dissolution and conception. For pregnancy, I only include a
pregnancy indicator. The hazard of becoming employed or nonemployed are likely to be well
represented by the other observed covariates (age, education, etc.) and the correlated structure
of unobserved heterogeneity. Other eects, like the eect the union dissolution hazard would
have on employment outcomes are of minor interest and can be neglected. These choices result
in a triangular form of the system of hazards which makes identication more easy and estimation
more tractable.
5.1 Likelihood Function
Let ψ(t) denote the history of outcomes, φs(t) = {T s(t), As(t), . . .} the path of observed com-
ponents relevant for each state s = E,U,M,D,C and vs be the value of the unobserved hetero-
geneity component. Further, let T = t̄i be the censoring point for individual i. Then conditional
on Φs(t) = φs(t), and V s = vs, the contribution to the likelihood function of person i's history
can be expressed as the product of the contribution of each spell in each state,



















where 1{S(t) = s} is a binary indicator for the current state.
The second term in equation (11) refers to all completed spells. Conditional on Φs(t) = φs(t),
and V s = vs, the contribution to the likelihood of the event of individual i moving from one state
to another for s = E,U,M,D or restarting the process s = C (i.e. restarting the conception













hs (u|φs(u), vsi ) du
)
, (12)
where for j = 1, ti,0 is the individual date of labor market entry. In equation (12) the right-hand
side has the familiar "hazard function times survivor function"-expression, where the rst term
provides the hazard, i.e. the intensity of moving from one state to another and the second term
is the probability of no events taking place between time ti,j−1 and ti,j. Because ti,0 ≥ t̃i,0, where
t̃i,0 is the start date of the current (union formation, union dissolution, or conception) spell before
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entering the labor market, equation (12) automatically corrects for left-truncation by conditioning
on the probability of no events taking place between time t̃i,0 and ti,0 (see for example D'Addio
and Rosholm, 2002). Under the assumption that t̄i is independent of the transition processes
and observed and unobserved heterogeneity, t̄i is uninformative about the parameters of interest
and the distribution of t̄i can be ignored in the likelihood function. Therefore, the contribution









hs (u|φs(u), vsi ) du
)
. (13)
Equation (13) is simply the probability of no events taking place between ti,ni and t̄i.
5.2 Initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity
As already mentioned, individuals may form unions or have children before entering the labor
market. These outcomes may be inuenced by unobserved characteristics, such as a strong
preference for having children. In addition, the rst employment state may be inuenced by
unobserved characteristics, such as a strong motivation to work. In general, such unobserved
characteristics may bias results of other covariates. For example, a strong desire for children
may result in having children while being in education and thereby aect the educational level,
which in turn has an eect on the entry date and later on on other employment outcomes. It
is therefore necessary to take account of these so-called initial conditions. Following Wooldridge
(2005), I condition each of the processes of an individual i on a set of covariates Zs(ti,0), where
Z
s(ti,0) accounts for the age at entry, whether the individual is employed after entering the labor
market, whether she was in a union, had children, and of an interaction term accounting for
whether she went to university and had children prior to entering the labor market. Conditioning
on Zs(ti,0) requires to specify the probability function of Vi conditional on Z
s(ti,0) in order to
integrate out the unobserved eect Vi. Wooldridge (2005) suggests the use of a parsimonious
function for specifying the probability function of V si conditional on Z
s(ti,0). I assume V
s
i to be
a linear function of Zs(ti,0) and a residual random eect W
s
i , whose distribution is independent
of everything else, i.e. V si = γ
s
Z




s(ti,0) results in integrating over the unconditional distribution of the random eect W
s
i and
estimating some additional coecients that refer to Zs(ti,0), i.e. to the "initial conditions". The




L (ψ(ti,ni), t̄i|z(ti,0), wi) dA
∗ (w) , (14)
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where A∗ is the time-invariant marginal distribution of wi and integration is done using a Stieltjes
integral.
In contrast to what is common in the literature, I do not assume Wi to be multivariate normal
distributed. I follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and assumeWi to take on only a small number of
dierent values. Steele et al. (2005) show how a discrete frailty may also be used for simultaneous
hazard models. Let the discrete support of W si be w
s
1, . . . , w
s
M and let πm = P(Wi = wm) be






L (ψ(ti,ni), t̄i|z(ti,0)) πm. (15)
It is common practice to think of the points of support as dierent types of persons. Using
a larger number of types results in a more exible distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. In
practice however, most studies only use a small number of types. Following Gaure et al. (2005)
I use the Akaike Information Criterion in order to select an appropriate number of M = 3 points
of support for Models A and M = 4 for Model B.
5.3 Identication
The identication scheme for Model A is similar to the ones proposed by Aassve et al. (2006),
Steele et al. (2005), or Upchurch et al. (2002). Model A uses the information on repeated events
for each individual, i.e. multiple transitions from employment to nonemployment and vice versa,
multiple union formation and dissolution, and multiple conceptions. There are also overlaps of
all varieties in the events across the ve processes. Identication is then ensured, as unobserved
heterogeneity is assumed to be time-constant for each individual. The potentially endogenous
variables enter the other processes as lagged transitions or the stocks of outcomes. This ensures
identication of the parameters without further exclusion restrictions (see Maddala, 1983).
Such exclusion restrictions, however, are required for identication of the preferred Model B. In
this model, the (contemporaneous) hazards of employment and nonemployment enter the pro-
cesses of union formation and dissolution, while the (contemporaneous) hazards of employment,
nonemployment, union formation, and dissolution enter the process of conception. As Lillard
(1993) points out, dependence on the contemporaneous hazards requires exclusion restrictions,
i.e. variables are required to have an eect on, for example, the process of employment but must
not enter the processes of union formation and dissolution, and the process of conception. As
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one can only be employed or nonemployed at a time, the same set of variables could enter the
processes of employment and nonemployment. The same holds true for union formation and
dissolution. Identication of Model B is more involved, because the employment and nonemploy-
ment hazards enter the conception hazard a second time via the union formation and dissolution
hazards. This requires that the union formation and dissolution hazards include variables that
neither enter the conception hazard nor the employment and nonemployment hazards. As mentio-
ned, the process starts at dierent times and there are all forms of overlaps. Further, time enters
the processes in a nonlinear way. Therefore, the variables accounting for duration dependence
should suce as exclusion restrictions. Nonetheless, it is always better to have more exclusion
restrictions. Therefore, for each process an additional set of exclusion restrictions is used. By
taking advantage of the variation over time in the maternity leave durations, I can construct a
binary indicator for whether an individual is currently taking or could potentially take maternity
leave. This indicator is the used as an exclusion restriction for the hazards of becoming employed
and nonemployed. However, this exclusion restriction is only meaningful for women. Further
exclusion restrictions are, for example, macroeconomic variables like the regional unemployment
rate, the regional growth rate or the regional birth rate. A full list of all exclusion restrictions for
each process is given in Table 13 in the Appendix.
The eects the endogenous variables have on the respective simultaneous hazards, can also be
considered as treatment eects. For example, the treatment of moving from employment to
nonemployment may change the probability of conceiving, while the treatment of conception
may change the search behavior of nonemployed individuals. Identication of such treatment
eects, however, requires that the treatment date can not be anticipated (see Abbring and van
den Berg, 2003a, 2004). If the exact date of treatment were known, individuals would act on this
information and parameter estimates could not be identied. This does not mean that individuals
do not know about the process itself and do not act on this information. However, it is necessary
that transition dates are dened as dates when information about an event emerges. In sum this
means that identication is still given, although individuals may act on the conception process,
for example by stopping the usage of contraceptives, because the point of conception is still
random. Nonetheless, one has to be cautious about women's transitions from employment to
nonemployment, as these may to some extent be planned events in order to become pregnant.
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6 Results
Following Gauré et al. (2006) the Akaike selection criterion is used to choose the appropriate
number of points of support for the unobserved heterogeneity. For both genders the AIC selects
three mass points for Model A and four mass points for Model B16. The results for both genders
are presented in the Tables 3-7. Coecients are given as average partial eects and standard
errors are calculated using the Delta method. If there are no major dierences between Model A
and B, only results for the preferred Model B are discussed.
 Table 3 about here 
 Table 4 about here 
 Table 5 about here 
 Table 6 about here 
 Table 7 about here 
6.1 The eects of employment on union formation, dissolution and
conception
In contrast to Aassve et al. (2006) my results for Model A suggest that the employment state
has no eect on nding a partner for women and but a slightly positive eect for men, as can
be seen in the rst and third column of Table 5. However, this positive eect vanishes for Model
B, a point that can be seen in the second and fourth column of Table 5, and results suggest
that men with a high hazard of losing a job are less likely to start a union. This means that
for men the stability of a job is important and less the job itself. My results are therefore in
line with Ahn and Mira (2001) who show that Spanish men delay marriage decisions due to bad
employment prospects. Results for Model B further indicate that women with a high hazard of
nding a job are more likely to nd a partner. One reason may be that women with better labor
16See the Appendix for a comparison of the values of the AIC.
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market perspectives are more condent and therefore considered as more attractive or partners
want to benet from better labor market perspectives.
With regard to union dissolution, as shown in columns one and three of Table 6, results for Model
A indicate that unions of employed men tend to be more stable, while no such eect can be found
for women. However, the eect for men is no longer signicant, if the hazards of nding and
losing employment are included as regressors (see column four of Table 6). Nonetheless, results
still indicate that male employment plays a positive role for union stability. These results are
supported by Eliason (2012) who shows that for Swedish men a job loss increases the excess
divorce rate by 13%. Since men still contribute a larger part to the household income, a job loss
often results in a severe loss of household income. This in turn may yield a loss of self-condence
as unemployed men can not manage their role as breadwinners what may destabilize a union.
For women the eects are ambiguous. While for couples in which women contribute a large part
to the household income a wife's job loss may destabilize a union, the eect might be reverse
for women becoming housewives. Therefore, it is not surprising that no eect can be found for
women.
With regard to conception, results for Model A indicate that being employed has no eect on
childbearing for men and a negative eect for women (see columns one and three of Table 7).
For men the absence of a positive employment eect is surprising, because most nonemployed
men are unemployed and it is plausible that unemployed men are less likely to have children than
employed men due to income restrictions. The results are also in contrast to what Aassve et
al. (2006) have found. For women the negative employment eect vanishes for Model B (see
column two of Table 7) and is now captured by the hazard of losing a job which indicates that
for women a high hazard of losing a job decreases the hazard of having children. This is similar
to what Del Bono (2001) nds for British women. Women working in an unstable employment in
general depend heavily on the income from these employments. This is particularly true for single-
mothers and women living in households depending strongly on wife's income. It is therefore not
surprising that women with a high risk of becoming nonemployed are less likely to have children.
For men, results from Model B suggest that a low hazard of nding a job increases the hazard of
having children (see column four of Table 7). Men with low job market perspectives might spend
more time in other activities than searching for a job, which may include having children and
they might also care less about contraceptives. Nonetheless, the absence of any positive eect
of being employed for men is surprising.
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6.2 The eects of partnership on employment, nonemployment and
conception
For women having a partner increases the likelihood of becoming nonemployed and decreases the
likelihood of nding a job (see columns one and two of Tables 3 and 4). Although the eects are
small, they are signicant and point in the same direction as supposed by Aassve et al. (2006).
For men the eects point in the opposite direction (see columns three and four of Tables 3 and
4). My results therefore suggest a classical division of labor between women and men, with men
as breadwinners and women as housewives. Surprisingly, the educational level of the partner does
not seem to play a role, as the coecients are very small and mostly insignicant.
Obviously, having a partner strongly increases the conception hazard (see columns one to four
of Table 7). One can see that the eects are stronger for Model A than for Model B, since
the hazards of starting and ending a union capture these eects in parts. Surprisingly, a high
hazard of losing a partner results in an increase of the hazard of having children (see column
two of Table 7) for women. An 1% increase in the union dissolution hazard increases the hazard
of having a child by 1.15% for women. The eect is also large for men but not signicant.
These ndings are in contrast to large parts of the economic theory (see for example Becker et
al., 1976) which predicts that couples with a high risk of splitting up are less likely to invest
in partnership-specic capital and therefore tend to have fewer children. The result is also in
contrast to Lillard (1993) who nds that an 1% increase in the hazard of union dissolution results
in a decrease of the conception hazard by -1.62%. Note that the presented results here are based
on cohabiting couples who are not necessarily married. It is important to note that Becker et
al. (1976) and Lillard (1993) base their results on data of cohorts which had explicitly higher
separation costs17. Over the years however, separation costs have considerably fallen. Today,
many women work and therefore do not depend exclusively on husbands alimonies. Furthermore,
normative issues seem to be less important, which is reected in an increasing number of single-
mothers and step families. A further aspect that has to be taken into consideration is that most
forms of investment into partner-specic capital, e.g. marriage, have become less valuable with
lower separation costs. The only investment that may be considered as an exception is having
children. Therefore, for couples with a high risk of dissolving, having children may present the
best form of investment, if they want to maintain their relationship, i.e. children are used in
17Lillard (1993) uses data of US-American marriages for the period from 1955 until 1985 and accounts only for
married couples and children born within a marriage.
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order to rescue the relationship. This may to some extent explain why couples with a high risk
of dissolving are more likely to have children.
The results found here also shed some light on the increase in single-mothers and the high
proportion of mothers among separated and divorced women. If couples that are likely to split
up had fewer children, the proportion of mothers should be lower among separated and divorced
women. However, results for Germany show that for the cohort 1959-1968 the proportion of
mothers is the same for married and divorced women18. As some of the couples with a high risk
of dissolving maintain their relationship due to the investment in children and therefore increase
the proportion of mothers among married women, these results support the ndings here. Also
Kohler et al. (2006) show that from a European perspective the result seems to hold. They nd
that the cross-sectional correlation coecient between the total fertility rate and the divorce rate
of several European countries has switched from negative to positive between 1975 and 2002.
6.3 The eects of children and childbearing
In contrast to Aassve et al. (2006), I also include a dummy variable that displays current pre-
gnancy. This variable leads to some changes with respect to variables that account for the number
of children, in particular, for women. While the number of children accounts mostly for long-run
decisions, current pregnancy accounts mostly for short-run decisions. With regard to the transi-
tion from employment to nonemployment, the results show that fathers are less likely to become
nonemployed (see columns three and four of Table 3). Because children cause costs, there is
an incentive to work for fathers who usually contribute a larger part to the household income.
Fathers may therefore choose jobs that are more stable and put more emphasis on fullling their
duties. Furthermore, for men virtually no eect can be found for the transition from nonemploy-
ment to employment (see columns three and four of Table 4). So far the literature has neglected
that children may also have positive eects on job stability of women. By including a binary
indicator for current pregnancy, I am able to show that it is only pregnancy that drives women
out of employment, while children strongly increase the attachment with the current job (see
columns one and two of Table 3). A possible reason for this is an increase in household expenses
due to children and therefore a higher motivation to work and to remain employed. The nding
is also of particular interest, because it applies most notably to women that are strongly aected
18For both groups the rate of mothers is around 90% (See Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012)
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by increases in household expenses, like single-mothers or women from low-income households.
For the hazard of becoming employed, my results show that for nonemployed women, children
and a current pregnancy strongly hamper the return to employment (see columns one and two of
Table 4). This is in line with the existing literature which deals with the interrelation of fertility
and female labor force participation (see for example Hyslop, 1999, or Michaud and Tatsiramos,
2011). However, most studies neglect that eects are dierent for women that are dependent on
their job because of income reasons, e.g. single-mothers. The results in this paper show that for
these women children strongly increase the attachment to their jobs.
With regard to the hazard of starting a union, the results in column one to four of Table 5
show that a current pregnancy more than quadruplicates this hazard for women and more than
septuples it for men19. This is consistent with economic theory, which predicts that cohabitations
are more benecial once partner-specic capital has been acquired. Moreover, normative aspects
may force individuals to enter a union. Interestingly, the eect seems to be stronger for men.
One reason for this may be that men tend to underreport children born outside a union more
often than women. The number of children has no eect on forming a union for both women and
men. This is surprising because children are generally considered to impede entering a (second)
union. However, as already mentioned, the costs of entering a subsequent union have fallen.
Turning to the union dissolution hazard, one can see that the number and age of children play a
strong role for the stability of a union (see columns one to four of Table 6). Economic theory often
names children as a typical form of partner-specic capital increasing the cost of a dissolution.
However, the eect seems to reduce somewhat with the age of children. This is in line with other
empirical ndings (see for example Steele et al., 2005, or Lillard and Waite, 1991). Normative
forces may explain to a large extent the strong eect a current pregnancy has on the union
dissolution hazard (reduces the hazard by 90% for women and 98% for men).
The results in columns two and four of Table 7 show that the rst child reduces the hazard of
conception by around 44% for women and 48% men compared to having no children. However,
the eects are oset, if the child is younger than three years, whereas three years is the typical
time span within a second child is born. A second child then reduces the hazard by around 88%
for women and men, while the eect for three or more children is even stronger. These ndings
support the classical role model of families having two children born within a short time interval.
19Percentage values for the respective eects of a binary indicator can be calculated by exp(βi) − 1, where
βi = ei, ui,mi, di, ci
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6.4 The eects of education
Note that education is measured by the highest degree obtained. For men, a higher educational
level goes along with a higher job stability (see columns three and four of Table 3). This is
not the case for women, for whom the hazard for a transition to nonemployment seems to be
unaected by the educational level (see columns one and two of Table 3). Furthermore, better
educated women and men are more likely to nd employment when nonemployed (see columns
one to four of Table 4). Interestingly, the results for women are stronger than for men. This might
indicate that highly educated women also return to employment more quickly after a voluntary
nonemployment period (e.g. a parental leave).
The results in columns one to four of Table 5 suggest that for women education does not seem
to have an eect on the hazard of union formation, while men with a university degree are more
likely to nd a cohabiting partner. Because higher education is also linked to more prestigious
jobs and higher wages, this result supports the idea of a Jane Austen's world, where women prefer
successful partners (Coles and Francesconi, 2011). Furthermore, the results in columns one and
two of Table 6 show that a women's education plays no role for the decision to end a union, while
results in columns three and four indicate that unions of better educated men are more stable.
However, these eects are smaller for Model B, i.e. the variables accounting for education in
Model A seem to capture in parts the eects of the hazards of nding and losing employment.
With regard to conception, results from Model B indicate that women and men having obtained
a university degree are more likely to have children (see columns two and four of Table 7). On
rst sight, this result is surprising as academics are usually considered to have a low birth rate.
However, two aspects may play a role here. First, university graduates are on average older when
entering the labor market. This means that they are faced with a higher biological pressure to
have children and therefore have children more rapidly. Furthermore, education accounts in parts
for the current income level and also expectations about future income. Therefore, results for
education suggest that the income level and income stability play a role for the decision on having
children.
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6.5 The eects of age
Concerning age eects, the results for men are as expected. Older men are less likely to become
nonemployed, but also less likely to nd a job (see columns three and four of Table 3). For women
these results do not hold (see columns one and two of Table 3). Interestingly, both transitions
from and to employment do not seem to depend on the current age of a woman. By contrast,
Steele (2005) nds that for Australian women job stability increases with age.
The results for the union formation process (see columns one to four of Table 5) exhibit an
inverse U-shape with respect to age for women and men with a peak for the group aged 25 to 30,
indicating that within this age interval most unions are formed. Although many individuals nd
their partner at an earlier stage, cohabitations typically start when individuals have entered the
labor market. Nonetheless, nding a cohabiting partner becomes less and less likely the older an
individual gets. In particular, women aged 40 or older have poor chances of nding a cohabiting
partner. These women are even less likely to start a union than women aged 20 or younger, i.e.
women who are mostly still in school and live with their parents. The results with regard to age
are in line with the literature, although Brien et al. (1999) nd that American women and men
enter unions at an earlier stage. However, the authors use data from the National Longitudinal
Study of the High School Class of 1972, i.e. of a much older cohort. The union dissolution
hazard seems to be independent of age (see columns one to four of Table 6). Even though one
could assume that older partners have more stable unions, results show that this is not the case.
The results for duration dependence show that the duration of a union and not the individuals
age increases the stability of a union.
The results from Model B indicate that the hazard of conception also exhibits a typical inverse
U-shape for both women and men (see columns two and four of Table 7). Women most likely
become pregnant between 25 and 30, while men most likely become fathers between 30 and 35.
Not surprisingly, men aged 40 or older are still more likely to become father than men aged 20 or
younger, while the hazard of becoming pregnant drops sharply for women aged 40 or older due
to biological reasons.
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6.6 State dependence eects
The results for duration dependence are fully captured by the baseline hazards which are displayed
in Figures 2 and 3. The transitions from employment to nonemployment exhibit strong negative
duration dependence, i.e. transitions become less likely over time for both men and women. At
least for men, this is a typical nding, often linked with higher opportunity costs for a dismissal
and institutional issues, like Germany's strict Dismissal Protection Law. In addition, the likelihood
of a transition for both women and men increases with the number of prior employment spells
but not with their duration (see columns one to four of Table 3). The results therefore indicate
stigmatization eects and no positive eect on human capital due to longer lasting employment
spells.20
With regard to the transition from nonemployment to employment, the results show a decaying
baseline hazard for women and men. For men, however, the baseline hazard rst increases strongly
and then decreases to its base level, while for women, the baseline hazard decreases directly. In
general, decaying baseline hazards are often found in the literature (see for example Cockx and
Dejemeppe, 2005) and typically linked with decreases in human capital or stigmatization eects.
Results for men also suggest that again no lagged duration dependence can be found and that the
more often someone has been employed, the more likely he is to nd employment (see columns
three and four of Table 4). However, the jobs found seem to be of a poor quality, as results
for occurrence dependence for the hazard of becoming nonemployed reveal. This means that for
men, there might be a vicious circle of unstable employment and nonemployment and exiting
this circle becomes less likely the more often someone has transited between employment and
nonemployment.
The success of search for a partner seems to depend only on age, but not on the duration of the
search process (see columns one to four of Table 5). By contrast, a reverse eect is found for
the process of splitting up a partnership, when age does not play a role, but an inverse U-shaped
pattern is found for the baseline hazard for women and men (see columns one to four of Table 6).
Such an inverse U-shape is plausible, because the longer a relationship lasts, the higher are the
costs of splitting up. Furthermore, the start of a cohabiting union is related to an investment,
e.g. the partners have to move together, and therefore typically do not split up directly. For
women, the number of prior partnerships does not play a role for both transitions, meaning that
20Note that the number of nonemployment spells is directly linked to the number of employment spells.
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they neither learn from prior partnerships nor are stigmatized by having had many relationships
before (see columns one and two of Table 6). However, for men, the union formation hazard
increases with the number of prior partnerships.
Note that the process of conception is a recursive one. While eects for the rst birth are mostly
captured by age variables, variables concerning duration dependence mostly capture eects from
subsequent births. Therefore, the strong peak for the period from two to ve years after a birth,
probably indicates that a subsequent birth typically occurs within a time span of two to ve years.
Separate estimation of hazard rates subject to the order of birth would certainly help to elaborate
such eects in more detail.
6.7 The eects of environmental and other background variables
My results for the transitions from and to employment suggest that the region in Germany has
no eect on becoming nonemployed (see columns one to four of Table 3) but that men living in
East Germany are less likely to nd employment (see columns three and four of Table 4). Similar
to this nding, the results also show that an increase in the current unemployment rate does not
play a role for the hazard of becoming nonemployed but decreases the hazard of nding a job for
men. Furthermore, for men, a decay in the regional growth rate reduces the hazard of nding a
job, while it has almost no eect on the transition from employment to nonemployment. For men,
the ndings with respect to regional unemployment and growth rate are therefore consistent with
Hall (2005) who argues that during slack periods, unemployment rises mainly due to low hiring
rates rather than increased separations. Nonetheless, the situation is reverse for women, for whom
an increase in the regional unemployment rate increases the hazard of becoming nonemployed
(see columns one and two of Table 3), while the regional growth rate has a positive eect on
becoming employed (see columns one and two of Table 4). Furthermore, my results suggest for
both genders that public employees, civil servants and self-employed individuals are less likely
to become nonemployed, while employees with a temporary contract are more likely to become
nonemployed. The results also point out that during maternity leave, women are less likely to
become employed but also less likely to become nonemployed. For men, no such eect can be
found21. The transition from nonemployment to employment also includes two binary indicators
21Maternity leave periods are modeled via a binary indicator that points out whether an individual is currently
entitled to take maternity leave. As it is the wife who normally is entitled to take maternity leave, for men, the
binary indicator is likely to act as a proxy for whether the wife is working or not.
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for whether an individual is unemployed or in education. They indicate that unemployed individuals
return to employment more quickly than housewives or individuals in education. This is mostly
due to the longer durations of the latter two occupations.
The only background variable having an eect on the union formation hazard is a dummy variable
characterizing the months from March to September (see columns one to four of Table 5). Results
show that during spring and summer months women and men more are more likely to start a
cohabiting union. With regard to the union dissolution hazard, results show that women living in
the East Germany are more likely to end their relationship, while no eect can be found for men
(see columns one to four of Table 6). Note that individuals in the sample were not raised in East
Germany but moved to this region later. As unemployment risk is considerably larger in East
Germany, the dummy variable might act as a proxy for spouse's employment state. The results
may therefore indicate that women tend to quit a relationship if the spouse is unemployed. Unions
are also more stable, if one of the partners belongs to a religious denomination, probably, because
conservative values and norms may be more important to them. With regard to information on
the partner, the results depend strongly on the model choice (see columns one to four of Table
6). While most coecients are signicant for Model A, this is no longer the case for Model B.
Finally, the results show that women are more likely to end their relationships during the second
half of year.
Turning to the conception hazard, my results suggest that the place of residence has no eect on
the hazard of conception (see columns one, two and four of Table 7), although Model A indicates
that for men, living in East Germany has a small and signicant, positive eect on having children.
Furthermore, belonging to a religious denomination increases the hazard of having children. Also
a higher regional rate of births increases the likelihood for children. While this rate may proxy
for the number of nurseries or kindergartens, it also displays regional preferences and attitudes
towards children that may aect personal preferences. Finally, my results indicate that an increase
in the potential amount of child allowance22 tends to increase the hazard of having children for
women.
22Here the potential amount of child allowance is calculated as the amount an individual would potentially
receive for his or her next child. The amount is divided by the current average gross income in order to make the
amount of child allowance comparable across time.
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6.8 The eects of initial conditions
With respect to the hazard of becoming nonemployed, one can see that none of the coecients
are signicant except for the coecient for women's age at entry of Model B, which has a
small negative impact (columns one to four in Table 3). The results for the hazard of becoming
employed show that for women being in a union and having children before entering the labor
market have a positive eect on becoming employed (columns one and two in Table 4). This
is not very surprising, because women who have already formed their family before entering the
labor market may spend less time on raising children afterwards and are therefore more likely to
nd a job, if nonemployed.
The estimates for the union formation hazard suggest that men who have formed a union before
entering the labor market are more likely to form subsequent unions afterwards (columns three
and four in Table 5). The eect is in addition to the positive eect the cumulative number of
unions has on the hazard of nding a partner. For the union dissolution hazard, results indicate
that women who have formed a union prior to entering the labor market are more likely to quit
this or any subsequent union (columns one and two in Table 6). For men, a dissolution becomes
more likely, the older an individual is when entering the labor market. Note that the age at entry
is on average higher, the higher the educational degree. My results further show that having
obtained a university degree stabilizes unions of men. The result therefore holds particularly for
men who are old when entering the labor market and have not obtained a university degree.
The results for the conception hazard show that women who formed a union before entering the
labor market are less likely to have children (columns one and two in Table 7). Furthermore,
results for Model B predict that women who are older at entry are less likely to have children.
Again, note that the age at entry is, on average, higher, the higher the educational degree and
that having obtained a university increases the hazard of having children for women. Therefore,
the result holds particularly for women who are old when entering the labor market and have not
obtained a university degree.
6.9 The eects of unobserved heterogeneity
The eects of unobserved heterogeneity are only considered for Model B, i.e. four points of
supports are used for women and men. It is common to assume the points of support as dierent
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types of individuals. The results then show that for women the second type is the most likely,
while the other three types are almost equiprobable (e.g. column two in Table 3). With respect
to the dierent transitions, the types of support dier only very slightly (column two in Tables 3
to 7). In particular, the variation is small for the hazard of childbearing. However, the volatility
is relatively large with respect to the hazard of becoming employed. Of particular interest are
the second and the fourth type. The second type is characterized by stable employments, short
nonemployment periods, short periods of partner search and stable unions . The fourth type may
be attributed to housewives, since this type is characterized by stable jobs, long nonemployment
periods, short periods of search for a partner, stable unions and short periods until childbirth.
For men the situation diers strongly. Here the rst type is by far the most likely one. Together
with the third type, they account for more than 86% of all men (e.g. column four in Table 3).
One therefore should be cautious with the interpretation of types two and four. The rst type is
characterized by stable jobs, short job-search periods and short periods of search for a partner,
stable unions and short periods until childbirth (column four in Tables 3 to 7). The third type is
also characterized by stable jobs and short job-search periods, but longer periods of search for a
partner and periods until childbirth, and also less stable unions.
I also calculated the correlations between the mass points for unobserved heterogeneity in Model
A and B (Tables 8 to 11). Although one has to be cautious with the interpretation, since for
calculation of the correlations only three dierent values are used for Model A and four for
Model B, comparing correlations for Model A and B provides some interesting insights. For both
genders, Model A provides evidence for a strong positive correlation between union dissolution
and conception and strong negative correlation between union formation and conception. These
ndings are similar to Aassve et al. (2006) who uses data on British women and men. However,
the situation is dierent for Model B. By including the union formation and dissolution hazards
as regressors for the conception hazard, the coecients switch signs. This means that to some
extent the strong positive correlations in Model A are due to the strong positive eect the union
dissolution hazards have on the conception hazards.
7 Conclusion
This study investigates the interrelated eects of employment, cohabitation and fertility. Using
a simultaneous hazards approach due to Lillard (1993), I estimate a ve-equation model. An
33
important contribution of this paper is to provide evidence how labor market risks inuence union
formation, dissolution as well as childbearing decisions. I do so by including the employment and
nonemployment hazard rates as simultaneous regressors for the processes of union formation,
union dissolution and conception. Furthermore, also the union dissolution and union formation
hazard rates are used as regressors for the process of conception. The eects are analyzed using
a sample of German women and men born between 1960 and 1969, which is drawn from the
ALWA data set.
Results show that whether someone is employed generally has no eect on union formation,
union dissolution and childbearing. This holds for both women and men, although for employed
men, I nd a signicant low hazard of splitting up. Employed women with stable jobs and
nonemployed men with poor chances to nd a job are more likely to have children. The hazards
of becoming employed and nonemployed are mostly inuenced by the educational level and the
duration of the current employment or nonemployment period. Another nding is that family
events have signicant eects on the transitions from and to employment. The results are of
the expected direction. By adding a variable that indicates current pregnancy, I can show that
for women children reduce the likelihood of becoming nonemployed. This is interesting also
from a policy perspective, because many women who work and have (pre-school) children belong
to disadvantaged groups (single-mothers or women from low-income households). For these
women, children increase the dependence on earned income and therefore make transitions to
nonemployment less likely. Results further indicate that children, in particular pre-school children,
make unions more stable and do not present a burden for subsequent unions. Obviously, children
are more likely to be born inside a union. However, my results show that unions that are likely
to split up may use children as an investment in partnership-specic capital in order to stabilize
their relationship. This is in line with an increase in single-parents and step-families. Overall, the
results support the view that the eects from employment on cohabitation and fertility are not
as strong as the other way round. The interrelation between cohabitation and childbirth however
exhibits strong inuences for both directions.
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9 Tables






Year of birth 1964.21 1964.23
Education (completed)
Proportion No Degree 5.32% 3.13%
Proportion High School (HS) 2.24% 2.29%
Proportion Vocational Training (VT) 58.05% 52.52%
Proportion HS + VT 16.81% 13.95%
Proportion Technical College 6.51% 11.59%
Proportion University 11.06% 16.54%
Children
Children per person 1.57 1.26
Children born while in a union 1.41 1.16
Children born while not in a union 0.16 0.10
Children born while employed 1.05 1.18
Children born while nonemployed 0.52 0.08
Proportion having no children 18.98% 35.21%
Proportion having 1 child 22.62% 23.25%
Proportion having 2 children 43.84% 33.54%
Proportion having 3 children 12.61% 6.78%
Proportion having at least 4 children 1.96% 1.22%
Age at 1st child 27.00 29.65
Age at 2nd child 29.62 32.24
Age at 3rd child 31.78 34.50
Age at 4th child 33.18 35.71
Years in E/NE until 1st child 6.29 7.76
Years in E/NE until 1st child if no NE 6.05 6.38
Years in E/NE until 1st child if NE 6.64 8.67
Years in E/NE until 1st child if no TE 6.14 7.49
Years in E/NE until 1st child if TE 6.78 8.49
Relationships
Relationships per person 1.14 1.11
Proportion forming no union 6.58% 10.67%
Proportion forming 1 union 74.58% 69.74%
Proportion forming 2 unions 17.09% 17.61%
Proportion forming 3 or more unions 1.75% 1.98%
Age at 1st union 24.21 26.95
Age at 2nd union 30.09 33.51
Age at 3rd union 34.48 35.62
Continued on next page
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Employment
Age at labor market entry 20.92 22.15
Number of periods employed 1.99 1.95
Number of periods nonemployed 1.46 1.29
Months spent employed 191.87 226.79
Months spent nonemployed 71.15 21.42
If not specied, mean is given
E: Employment, NE: Nonemployment, TE: Temporary Employment
Table 2  Model Selection
1 MP 2 MP 3 MP 4 MP
Women
AICA 76681.495 76514.196 76465.107***
AICB 76413.057 76246.225 76210.656 76154.036***
Men
AICA 64014.617 63737.815 63699.166***
AICB 63894.321 63614.514 63582.083 63558.382***
Chosen Model indicated by ***
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Table 3  Employment to Nonemployment
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Duration dependence
Elapsed duration (base: <6 months)
Elapsed 6-12 months 0.1289 0.1255 0.2971 0.3162*
(0.1379) (0.1344) (0.1877) (0.1867)
Elapsed 12-24 months -0.1772 -0.2231** -0.1861 -0.1554
(0.1119) (0.1105) (0.1245) (0.1245)
Elapsed 24-60 months -0.2384** -0.3022*** -0.4650*** -0.4132***
(0.1080) (0.1065) (0.1215) (0.1225)
Elapsed 60-120 months -0.5070*** -0.6018*** -1.0057*** -0.9603***
(0.1266) (0.1242) (0.1530) (0.1556)
Elapsed >120 months -0.7768*** -0.8593*** -1.1826*** -1.0883***
(0.1761) (0.1751) (0.2260) (0.2376)
Age
Age structure (base: <20 years)
20-24 years -0.0640 -0.0409 -0.3151** -0.3279**
(0.1568) (0.1560) (0.1323) (0.1330)
25-29 years 0.1501 0.1594 -0.6779*** -0.6997***
(0.1735) (0.1718) (0.1706) (0.1723)
30-34 years 0.1489 0.1650 -0.8061*** -0.8228***
(0.2105) (0.2094) (0.2301) (0.2335)
35-39 years 0.2183 0.2523 -0.8631*** -0.8858***
(0.2459) (0.2443) (0.2887) (0.2917)
>40 years 0.2465 0.2920 -0.9033*** -0.9230***
(0.2896) (0.2898) (0.3339) (0.3356)
Education
Highest degree achieved (base: no degree)
Voc. Train. -0.0833 -0.0663 -0.3004** -0.3088**
(0.0903) (0.0827) (0.1502) (0.1296)
HS degree -0.1028 -0.0827 -0.0977 -0.1114
(0.2003) (0.2005) (0.2295) (0.2242)
HS + VT -0.1445 -0.1089 -0.4953*** -0.5286***
(0.1185) (0.1208) (0.1904) (0.1730)
Tech. College -0.0819 0.0108 -0.8998*** -0.9135***
(0.1618) (0.1607) (0.2197) (0.2073)
Uni. degree -0.2246 -0.1538 -0.8154*** -0.8411***
(0.1661) (0.1678) (0.2197) (0.2063)
Children
Number of children (base: no child)
1 child -0.3562*** -0.3204*** -0.1352 -0.1534
(0.1029) (0.1021) (0.1407) (0.1412)
2 children -0.5653*** -0.5341*** -0.3113* -0.3549**
(0.1302) (0.1309) (0.1702) (0.1717)
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Table 3  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
3 or more children -0.7666*** -0.7503*** -0.3669 -0.5016*
(0.2032) (0.2134) (0.2798) (0.2790)
children <3y -0.1481 -0.1347 -0.0718 -0.0781
(0.1490) (0.1442) (0.1977) (0.2045)
children 3y-6y 0.2327 0.2349** 0.0597 0.0573
(0.0969) (0.0950) (0.1183) (0.1191)
Pregnant 3.0415*** 3.0765*** -0.0729 -0.0989
(0.0604) (0.0633) (0.1687) (0.1740)
Union
Currently in a union 0.3701*** 0.3255*** -0.2998* -0.2961*
(0.1082) (0.1050) (0.1550) (0.1753)
Partner has VT (+HS) degree -0.0204 0.0287 0.0297 0.0137
(0.0793) (0.0833) (0.1539) (0.1575)
Partner has TC or UD degree -0.0594* -0.0353 0.1999 0.1675
(0.0800) (0.0806) (0.1860) (0.1848)
Other covariates
East 0.1385 0.0499 0.6086 0.6477
(0.3829) (0.3984) (0.4298) (0.4328)
Public employee -0.3537*** -0.3042*** -0.6278*** -0.6482****
(0.0606) (0.0617) (0.0976) (0.0997)
Civil servant -0.4554*** -0.4722*** -0.3159* -0.3602***
(0.1591) (0.1507) (0.1653) (0.1826)
Fixed-term contract 1.0667*** 1.0259*** 0.9034*** 0.9369***
(0.0966) (0.0949) (0.0953) (0.0989)
Self-employed -0.3252** -0.3077** -0.9783*** -0.9981***
(0.1435) (0.1428) (0.1793) (0.1941)
Regional U-rate 0.0169* 0.0178* -0.0009 -0.0044
(0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0129) (0.0133)
Regional growth rate 0.0018 0.0033 -0.0371** -0.0365**
(0.0126) (0.0471) (0.0154) (0.0156)
Maternity protection -0.6511*** -0.6526*** 0.0954 0.0945
(0.1629) (0.1529) (0.2004) (0.2060)
State dependence
Cum. # of employments 0.1335*** 0.1392*** 0.0823*** 0.0843***
(0.0513) (0.0471) (0.0209) (0.0199)
Cum. dur. in employment -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Cum. dur. in nonemployment 0.0006 0.0009 0.0008 0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Initial conditions
Situation at labor market entry
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Table 3  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Age at entry -0.0226 -0.0287* 0.0268 0.0305
(0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0205) (0.0204)
Employed at entry 0.0339 0.0469 0.0948 0.1004
(0.1120) (0.1085) (0.1509) (0.1520)
In union before entry -0.0267 -0.0437 -0.0119 -0.0144
(0.0645) (0.0640) (0.1179) (0.1204)
Children before entry 0.1884 0.1452 -0.4150 -0.3790
(0.2053) (0.2072) (0.4665) (0.4431)
Children while at college -0.1173 -0.1839 0.5258 0.5139





-5.2899*** -5.1292*** -4.2692*** -4.2846***
(0.3464) (0.3528) (0.4022) (0.4120)
ln υE
2
-5.2620*** -5.1559*** -3.7348*** -4.0681***
(0.3534) (0.3471) (0.4283) (0.4342)
ln υE
3
-4.6196*** -5.0829*** -4.2678*** -4.4563***






π1 0.4606*** 0.1745*** 0.7145*** 0.6423***
(0.0757) (0.0320) (0.0672) (0.1445)
π2 0.4044*** 0.5761*** 0.1172*** 0.0925***
(0.0782) (0.0795) (0.0174) (0.0226)
π3 0.1351** 0.1069** 0.1682** 0.2191
(0.0622) (0.0489) (0.0659) (0.1487)
π4 0.1425** 0.0461*
(0.0747) (0.0250)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Signicance on 10%, 5% and 1%-level is indicated by *, ** and ***
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Table 4  Nonemployment to Employment
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Duration dependence
Elapsed duration (base: <6 months)
Elapsed 6-12 months -0.3097*** -0.2667*** -0.4217*** -0.4110***
(0.1003) (0.1009) (0.0927) (0.0934)
Elapsed 12-24 months -0.3741*** -0.3014*** 0.6213*** 0.6263***
(0.1011) (0.1063) (0.0918) (0.0985)
Elapsed 24-60 months -0.2505** -0.1132 0.2470* 0.2786*
(0.1005) (0.1148) (0.1399) (0.1506)
Elapsed 60-120 months -0.5123*** -0.3942** 0.1068 0.0984
(0.1441) (0.1671) (0.1697) (0.1742)
Elapsed >120 months -0.6979*** -0.5560** -0.0283 -0.0473
(0.2060) (0.2290) (0.2378) (0.2384)
Age
Age structure (base: <20 years)
20-24 years -0.0398 0.1062 0.6278*** 0.6539***
(0.1847) (0.1904) (0.1531) (0.2384)
25-29 years -0.3613 -0.0884 0.4115* 0.5126**
(0.2335) (0.2465) (0.2141) (0.2329)
30-34 years -0.2188 0.1846 0.2737 0.4142
(0.2843) (0.2932) (0.2568) (0.2852)
35-39 years -0.5845* -0.0820 0.0611 0.2561
(0.3417) (0.3588) (0.3207) (0.3539)
>40 years -0.6612 -0.1735 -0.4205 -0.1835
(0.3965) (0.4060) (0.4247) (0.4687)
Education
Highest degree achieved (base: no degree)
Voc. Train. 0.8794*** 0.4586*** 0.2751** 0.3904***
(0.1637) (0.1561) (0.1236) (0.1215)
HS degree 0.2668 0.1551 -0.2433 -0.2279
(0.2639) (0.2014) (0.2030) (0.2152)
HS + VT 0.9153*** 0.4796** 0.2370 0.3837**
(0.2195) (0.1917) (0.1634) (0.1694)
Tech. College 1.1764*** 0.6571** 0.5697** 0.6274***
(0.4078) (0.2699) (0.2252) (0.2132)
Uni. degree 1.4576*** 1.0024*** 0.3015 0.3561*
(0.3241) (0.2828) (0.2107) (0.2158)
Children
Number of children (base: no child)
1 child -0.5045*** -0.6474*** 0.0379 -0.1173
(0.1396) (0.1938) (0.1840) (0.1877)
2 children -0.7162*** -1.1472*** -0.0377 -0.1431
(0.1724) (0.2562) (0.2098) (0.2468)
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Table 4  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
3 or more children -0.8842*** -1.4333*** 0.1788 0.2054
(0.2339) (0.3169) (0.3527) (0.4423)
children <3y -1.0334*** -1.0443*** 0.1166 0.3253*
(0.1180) (0.1299) (0.2106) (0.1949)
children 3y-6y -0.1505* -0.0584 0.2257 0.2081
(0.0847) (0.0888) (0.1662) (0.1935)
Pregnant -1.6885*** -1.8701*** -0.0201 0.0222
(0.1905) (0.2171) (0.1625) (0.1617)
Union
Currently in a union -0.2758* -0.4291*** 0.3562** 0.3987*
(0.1481) (0.1566) (0.1800) (0.2125)
Partner has VT (+HS) degree 0.2226 0.1003 -0.2466 -0.2920*
(0.1555) (0.1635) (0.1631) (0.1771)
Partner has TC or UD degree 0.0554 -0.0334 -0.1482 -0.2435
(0.1517) (0.1702) (0.2301) (0.2339)
Other covariates
East -0.5014 -0.2257 -1.2903*** -1.3291***
(0.3360) (0.4410) (0.3973) (0.3892)
In education -0.4173*** -0.4503*** -0.5788*** -0.5620***
(0.1537) (0.1678) (0.1306) (0.1227)
Unemployed 0.9285*** 0.8814*** 1.3651*** 1.4234***
(0.0927) (0.0979) (0.1173) (0.1187)
Regional U-rate -0.0115 -0.0241 -0.0312** -0.0280**
(0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0139)
Regional growth rate 0.0393*** 0.0437** 0.0259 0.0308
(0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0178)
Maternity protection -0.2137 -0.3168** -0.0238 -0.1534
(0.1314) (0.1427) (0.2175) (0.2106)
State dependence
Cum. # of employments -0.0485 -0.1255 0.1127*** 0.0871***
(0.0666) (0.0780) (0.0154) (0.0268)
Cum. dur. in employment -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0012
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Cum. dur. in nonemployment 0.0015 0.0036* -0.0009 -0.0018
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Initial conditions
Situation at labor market entry
Age at entry -0.0157 -0.0298 -0.0157 -0.0215
(0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0227) (0.0230)
Employed at entry -0.2254 -0.0016 0.0829 0.0277
(0.1528) (0.0174) (0.1365) (0.1443)
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Table 4  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
In union before entry 0.1927* 0.2022* 0.1358 0.1341
(0.1070) (0.1183) (0.1543) (0.1815)
Children before entry 0.3450 0.5329** -0.1846 -0.2346
(0.2585) (0.2304) (0.2432) (0.2945)
Children while at college -0.1537 -0.3591 -0.4107 -0.3496





-1.7572*** -0.2822 -3.1150*** -3.1833***
(0.4885) (0.5313) (0.4400) (0.4417)
ln υU
2
-3.4207*** -1.9667*** -5.0168*** -5.3581***
(0.4717) (0.5181) (0.4580) (0.4638)
ln υU
3
-3.0926*** -3.8093*** -2.9143*** -2.7273***






π1 0.4606*** 0.1745*** 0.7145*** 0.6423***
(0.0757) (0.0320) (0.0672) (0.1445)
π2 0.4044*** 0.5761*** 0.1172*** 0.0925***
(0.0782) (0.0795) (0.0174) (0.0226)
π3 0.1351** 0.1069** 0.1682** 0.2191
(0.0622) (0.0489) (0.0659) (0.1487)
π4 0.1425** 0.0461*
(0.0747) (0.0250)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Signicance on 10%, 5% and 1%-level is indicated by *, ** and ***
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Table 5  Union formation
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Duration dependence
Elapsed duration (base: <6 months)
Elapsed 12-24 months 0.2148 0.1998 0.2125 0.2080
(0.1933) (0.1968) (0.1784) (0.1914)
Elapsed 24-60 months 0.2849* 0.2840* 0.0540 0.0841
(0.1728) (0.1721) (0.1692) (0.1800)
Elapsed 60-120 months 0.2713 0.2557 0.0511 0.0782
(0.2021) (0.1974) (0.1976) (0.2260)
Elapsed >120 months -0.0594 -0.0128 0.1282 0.2011
(0.2635) (0.2429) (0.2231) (0.2784)
Age
Age structure (base: <20 years)
20-24 years 0.5209*** 0.5768*** 0.5679** 0.5628**
(0.1990) (0.2100) (0.2615) (0.2668)
25-29 years 0.6589*** 0.7295*** 0.9414*** 0.9344***
(0.2246) (0.2370) (0.2822) (0.3067)
30-34 years 0.2173 0.3536 0.7617*** 0.7862**
(0.2444) (0.2827) (0.2916) (0.3245)
35-39 years -0.4992* -0.3211 0.3423 0.3872
(0.2777) (0.3285) (0.3177) (0.3632)
>40 years -1.3850*** -1.199*** 0.0212 0.0835
(0.3307) (0.3793) (0.3381) (0.3917)
Education
Highest degree achieved (base: no degree)
Voc. Train. 0.0594 0.0865 0.2062 0.2260
(0.1538) (0.1670) (0.1915) (0.1951)
HS degree -0.0198 0.0487 0.3137 0.3152
(0.2789) (0.2949) (0.2459) (0.2857)
HS + VT 0.1195 0.1491 0.3368 0.3499
(0.1907) (0.2111) (0.2225) (0.2296)
Tech. College 0.1076 0.0486 0.4782* 0.4464
(0.2393) (0.2635) (0.2624) (0.2891)
Uni. degree 0.2557 0.2569 0.5228** 0.5403*
(0.2474) (0.2725) (0.2611) (0.2858)
Children
Number of children (base: no child)
1 child -0.0634 -0.1284 0.1735 0.1018
(0.1783) (0.1875) (0.1786) (0.1858)
2 children 0.1956 0.1141 0.4620** 0.3856
(0.2070) (0.2262) (0.2301) (0.3045)
3 or more children 0.4201 0.3424 0.3991 0.3010
(0.3862) (0.4498) (0.5510) (0.6120)
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Table 5  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
children <3y -0.2818 -0.1855 0.2781 0.3195
(0.2065) (0.2241) (0.2074) (0.2175)
children 3y-6y -0.0071 0.0222 -0.1661 -0.1645
(0.1890) (0.1877) (0.1842) (0.1863)
Pregnant 1.7911*** 1.7330*** 2.2745*** 2.1780***
(0.1250) (0.4377) (0.1596) (0.1862)
Employment
Currently employed 0.0467 -0.1077 0.2003* 0.2490
(0.1467) (0.7903) (0.1045) (0.7402)
Hazard of becoming NE -0.0670 -0.1276*
(0.0693) (0.0727)
Hazard of becoming E 0.2268** 0.0395
(0.0946) (0.1208)
Other covariates
East -0.0120 0.0668 0.3857 0.4351
(0.4781) (0.4310) (0.3752) (0.4586)
Religion -0.0360 -0.0887 0.0311 -0.0049
(0.1156) (0.1294) (0.0838) (0.0952)
Spring / summer 0.5811*** 0.5823*** 0.4213*** 0.4227***
(0.0648) (0.0654) (0.0627) (0.0627)
State dependence
Cum. # of unions 0.0263 -0.1302 0.4104*** 0.3185*
(0.1394) (0.1557) (0.1543) (0.1763)
Initial conditions
Situation at labor market entry
Age at entry 0.0109 0.0017 -0.0175 -0.0192
(0.0213) (0.0245) (0.0197) (0.0233)
Employed at entry 0.0810 0.0897 0.1446* 0.1353
(0.0881) (0.1002) (0.0830) (0.0853)
In union before entry 0.1685 0.2481 0.2989* 0.3354*
(0.1536) (0.1676) (0.1737) (0.1972)
Children before entry -0.2985 -0.2559 0.4939 0.6163
(0.3284) (0.3474) (0.5668) (0.7101)
Children while at college -0.5316 -0.5463 -1.0736 -1.1840





-5.4430*** -4.7424*** -5.6292*** -5.3585***
(0.4937) (0.5857) (0.4535) (0.7387)
ln υM
2
-5.3878*** -4.3774*** -6.5917*** -6.3351***
(0.5235) (0.5733) (0.4407) (0.6711)
ln υM
3
-6.4926*** -4.5761*** -6.8274*** -6.6963***
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Table 5  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B






π1 0.4606*** 0.1745*** 0.7145*** 0.6423***
(0.0757) (0.0320) (0.0672) (0.1445)
π2 0.4044*** 0.5761*** 0.1172*** 0.0925***
(0.0782) (0.0795) (0.0174) (0.0226)
π3 0.1351** 0.1069** 0.1682** 0.2191
(0.0622) (0.0489) (0.0659) (0.1487)
π4 0.1425** 0.0461*
(0.0747) (0.0250)
Standard errors in parentheses
Signicance on 10%, 5% and 1%-level is indicated by *, ** and ***
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Table 6  Union dissolution
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Duration dependence
Elapsed duration (base: <12 months)
Elapsed 12-24 months 0.3327 0.2196 ** 0.5965*** 0.2365
(0.2607) (0.1044) (0.2411)
Elapsed 24-60 months 0.7388*** 0.3378*** 0.9949*** 0.5558
(0.2329) (0.1237) (0.2413) (0.4186)
Elapsed 60-120 months 0.6342** 0.2274* 1.0168*** 0.4142
(0.2624) (0.1244) (0.2734) (0.3962)
Elapsed >120 months 0.6961** -0.1315 0.9321*** 0.0283
(0.3218) (0.1500) (0.3522) (0.3252)
Age
Age structure (base: <20 years)
20-24 years 0.1744 -0.1109 0.3570 0.1916
(0.4711) (0.3052) (1.0762) (0.7639)
25-29 years -0.2733 -0.3736 0.2103 0.3999
(0.4890) (0.3093) (1.0694) (0.7423)
30-34 years -0.3313 -0.3350 0.4246 0.5039
(0.5137) (0.3233) (1.0837) (0.7842)
35-39 years -0.3286 -0.2346 0.3225 0.4873
(0.5373) (0.3495) (1.1039) (0.7870)
>40 years -0.4644 -0.3886 0.1740 0.3303
(0.5656) (0.3813) (1.1135) (0.8227)
Education
Highest degree achieved (base: no degree)
Voc. Train. -0.1158 0.1970 -0.4013 -0.1844
(0.2837) (0.1656) (0.3594) (0.2677)
HS degree -0.2488 0.2694 -0.6549 -0.2524
(0.5376) (0.2743) (0.5362) (0.4432)
HS + VT -0.1402 0.2230 -0.8763** -0.2934
(0.3420) (0.2098) (0.4327) (0.3545)
Tech. College -0.1961 0.1511 -1.0637** -0.5852
(0.3905) (0.2562) (0.5001) (0.3680)
Uni. degree -0.9908 -0.0472 -1.3856*** -0.7822*
(0.4608) (0.2845) (0.5311) (0.4216)
Children
Number of children (base: no child)
1 child -0.5310** -0.3208** -0.7149*** -0.5598***
(0.2101) (0.1634) (0.2269) (0.2086)
2 children -1.1930*** -0.8828*** -1.2335*** -1.0335***
(0.2721) (0.2145) (0.2852) (0.2747)
3 or more children -1.2238*** -0.8210*** -1.6534*** -1.2756***
(0.3680) (0.2823) (0.4523) (0.4758)
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Table 6  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
children <3y -0.4967** -0.4423** -0.9255*** -1.1025***
(0.1939) (0.1780) (0.2352) (0.2692)
children 3y-6y 0.1990 0.1299 -0.1753 -0.2784
(0.1629) (0.1424) (0.1988) (0.2015)
Pregnant -1.0725*** -2.3032*** -1.7662*** -3.7691***
(0.2848) (0.4451) (0.4196) (2.0350)
Employment
Currently employed -0.0447 0.0394 -0.6080*** -0.5630
(0.1668) (0.2574) (0.2070) (0.6364)
Hazard of becoming NE 0.0735 -0.0201
(0.1353) (0.1239)
Hazard of becoming E -0.1494 0.2741
(0.0993) (0.1866)
Other covariates
East 1.2406** 0.9101** 0.0982 -0.1743
(0.5515) (0.4229) (0.5035) (0.4891)
Religion -0.3809** -0.3211*** -0.3609** -0.2951**
(0.1494) (0.1216) (0.1410) (0.1230)
Age dierence -0.0045 -0.0130* 0.0596*** 0.0072
(0.0170) (0.0073) (0.0228) (0.0235)
Partner has higher edu. -0.0981 -0.0470 0.5484** 0.0504
(0.1945) (0.0693) (0.2193) (0.1932)
Partner has lower edu. -0.4631*** -0.0226 -0.4765*** -0.1899
(0.1392) (0.0590) (0.1783) (0.2052)
No information on partner 1.8136*** 0.1380 2.1354*** 0.6348
(0.2769) (0.2211) (0.2194) (1.0647)
Children from other partner 0.5605*** 0.2679** 0.1132 -0.0385
(0.2041) (0.1151) (0.2408) (0.1543)
2nd half of year 0.2683*** 0.1409*** 0.2518** 0.1140
(0.0997) (0.0513) (0.1008) (0.1163)
State dependence
Cum. # of unions 0.0011 0.0492 -0.1488 0.0242
(0.1817) (0.0726) (0.1803) (0.1228)
Initial conditions
Situation at labor market entry
Age at entry 0.0709 0.0362 0.0763** 0.0702***
(0.0299) (0.0228) (0.0327) (0.0262)
Employed at entry -0.0376 -0.0653 -0.0946 -0.0767
(0.1488) (0.1009) (0.1386) (0.1148)
In union before entry 0.2607* 0.3313*** -0.2513 -0.1790
(0.1465) (0.1128) (0.1984) (0.1684)
Children before entry 0.3204 -0.0496 -0.0663 0.1363
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Table 6  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
(0.2905) (0.2914) (0.6074) (0.5751)
Children while at college -0.5065 0.0691 -0.3542 -0.6571





-7.0306*** -7.0919*** -7.7167*** -6.2701***
(0.7428) (0.6533) (1.1797) (1.1055)
ln υD
2
-8.1419*** -7.1241*** -6.7809*** -5.4058***
(0.8076) (0.6159) (1.1931) (1.1811)
ln υD
3
-6.0201*** -8.0288*** -5.5205*** -4.8587***






π1 0.4606*** 0.1745*** 0.7145*** 0.6423***
(0.0757) (0.0320) (0.0672) (0.1445)
π2 0.4044*** 0.5761*** 0.1172*** 0.0925***
(0.0782) (0.0795) (0.0174) (0.0226)
π3 0.1351** 0.1069** 0.1682** 0.2191
(0.0622) (0.0489) (0.0659) (0.1487)
π4 0.1425** 0.0461*
(0.0747) (0.0250)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Signicance on 10%, 5% and 1%-level is indicated by *, ** and ***
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Table 7  Conception
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Duration dependence
Elapsed duration (base: <24 months)
Elapsed 24-60 months 1.4642*** 0.9969*** 1.3961*** 0.9419***
(0.0752) (0.0811) (0.0935) (0.1149)
Elapsed 60-120 months 1.1669*** 0.4172*** 0.8781*** 0.1502
(0.1030) (0.1423) (0.1348) (0.1959)
Elapsed 120-180 months 1.2254*** 0.1929 0.9687*** -0.1287
(0.1046) (0.1718) (0.1153) (0.2732)
Elapsed >180 months 1.2286*** 0.1227 1.1182*** -0.1460
(0.1259) (0.1962) (0.1329) (0.3212)
Age
Age structure (base: <20 years)
20-24 years 0.6098*** 0.6081* 0.5022 1.1257***
(0.2149) (0.3149) (0.3808) (0.5758)
25-29 years 0.7600*** 1.2776*** 0.7637** 1.7012***
(0.2100) (0.3193) (0.3721) (0.6280)
30-34 years 0.5319** 1.1755*** 0.7561** 1.7768***
(0.2178) (0.3308) (0.3691) (0.6912)
35-39 years -0.2781 0.2633 0.3749 1.4260***
(0.2418) (0.3717) (0.3764) (0.6968)
>40 years -1.9670*** -0.5683 -0.4500 0.5554
(0.3557) (0.5033) (0.4061) (0.6538)
Education
Highest degree achieved (base: no degree)
Voc. Train. -0.0507 -0.0930 0.1106 -0.0094
(0.1062) (0.1853) (0.1669) (0.2230)
HS degree -0.0668 -0.2269 -0.0061 -0.1054
(0.1738) (0.3236) (0.2335) (0.3410)
HS + VT -0.0504 -0.2290 0.1404 -0.0996
(0.1287) (0.2365) (0.1870) (0.3052)
Tech. College 0.0315 -0.2159 0.3487* 0.2299
(0.1706) (0.2959) (0.2054) (0.2948)
Uni. degree 0.2484 0.9970*** 0.5199** 0.8013**
(0.1615) (0.3135) (0.2105) (0.3709)
Children
Number of children (base: no child)
1 child -0.2869** -0.5768*** -0.3005** -0.6475***
(0.1115) (0.2067) (0.1344) (0.2310)
2 children -2.0050*** -2.1904*** -1.9403*** -2.1548***
(0.1785) (0.2704) (0.1944) (0.3155)
3 or more children -2.2807*** -2.5029*** -2.1638*** -2.3957***
(0.2669) (0.3875) (0.2809) (0.3924)
Continued on next page
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Table 7  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
children <3y 0.7869*** 0.4766** 0.9589*** 0.8050***
(0.0956) (0.2206) (0.1133) (0.1919)
children 3y-6y 0.2699*** 0.1429 0.3540*** 0.2589
(0.0252) (0.1793) (0.1047) (0.1710)
Union
Currently in a union 1.6424*** 1.0579*** 2.2721*** 1.6441***
(0.0903) (0.2317) (0.1211) (0.4356)
Hazard of nding partner -0.0048 -0.1156
(0.2042) (0.3689)
Hazard of losing partner 1.1493*** 0.7066
(0.2863) (0.5563)
Employment
Currently employed -0.3368*** 0.2523 -0.0286 -0.2980
(0.0572) (0.5705) (0.1108) (0.3946)
Hazard of becoming NE -0.2765* 0.0362
(0.1465) (0.0582)
Hazard of becoming E 0.0166 -0.1780*
(0.0909) (0.0983)
Other covariates
East 0.4238 -0.5185 0.4725** 0.5783
(0.2744) (0.5695) (0.2315) (0.4558)
Religion 0.4273*** 0.8940*** 0.2850*** 0.5261***
(0.0796) (0.1869) (0.0682) (0.1486)
Regional birth rate 0.1428*** 0.1465*** 0.1347*** 0.1375***
(0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0374) (0.0390)
Potential child allowance 0.0413 0.0532** -0.0160 -0.0064
(0.0252) (0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0251)
Initial conditions
Situation at labor market entry
Age at entry 0.0168 -0.0864*** 0.0136 -0.0803
(0.0133) (0.0298) (0.0139) (0.0839)
Employed at entry 0.0329 0.0814 0.0190 0.0988
(0.0571) (0.1151) (0.0623) (0.0975)
In union before entry -0.1003* -0.3820** -0.0471 0.1789
(0.0607) (0.1616) (0.0782) (0.1778)
Children before entry 0.0886 0.4780 -0.0859 -0.0864
(0.2023) (0.3982) (0.3059) (0.4108)
Children while at college 0.2893 0.0226 -0.2074 0.0169
(0.4122) (0.8019) (0.3645) (0.6733)
Unobserved heterogeneity
Points of support
Continued on next page
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Table 7  (continued)
Women Men
Model A Model B Model A Model B
ln υC
1
-9.7828 -7.6898*** -10.5124*** -10.7079***
(0.4942) (1.2271) (0.6102) (1.9128)
ln υC
2
-9.9413 -8.0124*** -10.6366*** -11.7387***
(0.4957) (1.1264) (0.6108) (2.3126)
ln υC
3
-9.1856 -7.5739*** -9.9820*** -11.1340***






π1 0.4606*** 0.1745*** 0.7145*** 0.6423***
(0.0757) (0.0320) (0.0672) (0.1445)
π2 0.4044*** 0.5761*** 0.1172*** 0.0925***
(0.0782) (0.0795) (0.0174) (0.0226)
π3 0.1351** 0.1069** 0.1682** 0.2191
(0.0622) (0.0489) (0.0659) (0.1487)
π4 0.1425** 0.0461*
(0.0747) (0.0250)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Signicance on 10%, 5% and 1%-level is indicated by *, ** and ***
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Correlations of unobserved heterogeneity
Women:
Table 8  Correlations for Model A (women)
EU UE UD UF C
EU 1 -0.348 0.897 -0.988 0.966
UE -0.348 1 0.101 0.200 -0.093
UD 0.897 0.101 1 -0.955 0.981
UF -0.988 0.200 -0.955 1 -0.994
C 0.966 -0.093 0.981 -0.994 1
Table 9  Correlations for Model B (women)
EU UE UD UF C
EU 1 -0.223 0.765 -0.940 -0.624
UE -0.223 1 0.457 -0.123 -0.620
UD 0.765 0.457 1 -0.939 -0.980
UF -0.940 -0.124 -0.939 1 0.853
C -0.624 -0.620 -0.980 0.853 1
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Men:
Table 10  Correlations for Model A (men)
EU UE UD UF C
EU 1 -0.961 0.005 -0.520 -0.295
UE -0.961 1 0.272 0.263 0.548
UD 0.005 0.272 1 -0.857 0.954
UF -0.520 0.263 -0.857 1 -0.663
C -0.295 0.548 0.954 -0.663 1
Table 11  Correlations for Model B (men)
EU UE UD UF C
EU 1 -0.914 0.873 -0.730 -0.369
UE -0.914 1 -0.600 0.390 -0.040
UD 0.873 -0.600 1 -0.971 -0.775
UF -0.730 0.390 -0.971 1 0.904
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A Denition of labor market entry
The labor market entry is dened as the start date of the rst spell after the individual has
left the educational institution, where she obtains or could possibly obtain her highest degree.
However, there are some exemptions for whom the denition of the labor market entry does not
t very well. An example may be an individual, who after obtaining an high school and vocational
training degree, works for ten years and then chooses to go to university. In order to account for
such exemptions, age limits are set, until which a certain type of education at latest has to be
started. The age levels are presented in table 12.
Schooling:
School type Age level
Lower secondary school 20
Intermediate school 21
Upper secondary school 23
Further Education:
Type of further education Age level
Vocational training 23
Master craftsmen's college 23
Technical college 25
University 26
For schooling, the age levels for starting a certain type of school are arbitrarily set to four years
after an individual typically nishes this form of schooling. For example, a typical individual leaves
upper secondary school at nineteen. The age level to start this form of schooling is therefore set
to 23. For further types of education the age levels are based on the required type of schooling
and the age an individual typically has, when nishing this form of schooling. Although, for
example, a relatively large fraction of individuals going to a master craftsmen's college do so at
higher ages, these individuals typically have worked for a longer period after their last degree and
63
therefore might have formed decisions with regard to their familiar situation.
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B Exclusion restrictions
Table 13  Process-specic exclusion restrictions
Hazard of becoming nonemployed
State dependence
Duration dependence
Cum. # of employments
Cum. dur. in employment





Hazard of becoming employed
State dependence
Duration dependence
Cum. # of employments
Cum. dur. in employment














Cum. # of unions
Additional exclusion restrictions
Age dierence
Partner has higher edu.
Partner has lower edu.
No information on partner
Children from other partner
2nd half of year
Conception hazard
State dependence
Duration dependence
Additional exclusion restrictions
Regional birth rate
Potential child allowance
65
